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Abstract 
Planning is intrinsically a political process. This paper explores how the practice 
and profession of planning has been affected by politics. Available evidence in 
Zimbabwe shows that planning is problematized by unsettled national and local 
politics. However, contested politics can distort the intentions of a sound 
planning system through advancing political interests of politicians, the ruling 
elite. Interviews with political actors and planners allow an understanding of 
how politics has virtually eroded, if not eliminated, a sound planning system. 
This paper illustrates three dimensions of the relationship between politics and 
planning. First, the political contestation between the ruling and opposition 
party has severely undermined planning and its contribution towards co- 
ordinated development in cities. Second, planners often succumb to the politics 
of patronage at the expense of urban residents and town planning principles. 
Third, the integrity and credibility of planning is seemingly under constant 
threat from political actors. 
 
1. Introduction 
Planning is deﬁned as a ‘self-conscious collective effort to imagine or re-imagine a 
town, city, urban region or wider territory and to translate the result into priorities 
for area investment, conservation measures, new and upgraded areas of 
settlement, strategic infrastructure investments and principles of land-use 
regulation’ (Healey, 2004: 46). Thus, people who conduct planning as a profession 
are called planners. Planners are people who have received some professional 
and/or academic training in planning (UN-Habitat, 2009). The conduct of 
planning depends on planning systems deﬁned as the ‘institutional, legal, 
regulatory and policy framework, and rationalities, techniques, and ideologies’ that 
inform and guide planning (Kamete, 2009: 898). These planning systems exist 
globally but differ contextually, based on the socioeconomic-political relations 
of power in a particular society (Williams, 2000). 
 
In the global South, rapid urbanisation is a common feature, especially in the age of 
globalisation (Castells, 2012). Urbanisation is managed through a process called 
planning (UN-Habitat, 2009). In this regard, the way cities are planned and 
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managed is therefore fundamental in reaching Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
11, in particular, in global South cities, where there exist widespread contestations 
over the planning and management of cities. Through SDG 11, the international 
community committed itself to ‘make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable’ by 2030 (UN, 2016). This means, among other things, that 
cities have to be inclusive, through addressing exclusion from the city and 
exclusion and segregation in the city (McGranahan, Schensul, & Singh, 2016). It is 
in this regard that the conduct of planners and planning approaches are important 
aspects that contribute to the achievement of SDG 11. 
 
Planning plays a fundamental role in politics and communities subject to existing 
political regimes (Miller, Sahama, Grace, Wilson, & Hefferan, 2011). Whilst 
much attention at the global level has been given to urbanisation; little has been 
done to understand people who plan and manage cities—planners. Thus, the 
reality is that ‘the role and expertise of planners remains largely invisible and 
poorly understood’ (Dredge & Coiacetto, 2006: 29). In many instances, planners 
are subservient to the whims of politics and politicians. Such a reality 
compromises the independence and integrity of the planning profession. 
 
Planning deals with the conﬁguration of space, though space is highly contentious 
(Crawford, 2009). In particular, planning engages with the distribution of 
competing land-uses. Hence, by nature, planning is a conﬂict generating activity. 
As such, politicians tend to use power and authority to resolve such conﬂict often 
citing ‘public interest’. Yet, in some instances, they will be protecting private and 
personal interests. 
 
This paper focuses on how Zimbabwe's politics affects the profession and practice of 
planning. Primarily, such a focus is driven by the unsettled nature of the country's 
politics which has spilled into planning. The political environment in Zimbabwe is 
also of greater importance in the sense that planning is caught up between two 
contesting political parties—Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) controlling the national government and the opposition Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) controlling the majority of the urban local authorities. 
We deﬁne politics as formal and informal power relations among actors such as 
central government, local authorities, political parties, and non-state actors. In 
addition, the relations between central and local governments have been frosty 
(Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016) and therefore, the paper explores the effects 
of such relations on planners in a highly contested political environment. Further 
focus is placed on Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (OM/RO), a campaign 
against informal housing and economic activities implemented by the Government 
of Zimbabwe in 2005. It is through OM/RO that the role of planners came to the 
fore. In this regard, we explore the public image of the planning profession after 
such a demolition campaign. 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
3 
 
This paper is structured as follows. After a brief introduction, we provide a critique 
of how politics and planning have been conceived in extant literature. Thereafter, 
the paper provides the context of planning and politics in Zimbabwe by 
indicating key political issues and programmes which inﬂuenced planning in situ 
such as economic structural adjustment programmes, land reform programme, 
politics of urban control and OM/RO. Next, we explain how data for this paper 
was collected. The paper moves to a discussion on central-local relations and 
planners, planners and turbulent politics and OM/RO and the planning profession. 
The paper concludes by critically assessing the credibility and integrity of planning. 
 
2. Politics and planning 
Studies on politics and planning have focused on motivations and experiences of 
planners (Miller et al., 2011); engagement of political actors in spatial planning 
(Walsh, 2014); planners and politicians (Krumholz, 2001); relations between 
planners and politicians (Campbell, 2001); politics of difference in planning 
(Iveson, 2000); planning amidst conﬂicting societies (Fenster, 2004) and 
preparing planners to deal with 21st century challenges (Sandercock, 1997) 
among others. 
 
Planning has been used to portray ‘contradictory expressions and belonging of 
Jews and Palestinians in Israel’ (Fenster, 2004: 403). In this case, planning has 
thus been the main method to which ﬁghts over territory and belonging affect 
the built environment. In post-war Naples, Allum (2003) examines how 
politicians thwarted the implementation of planning policies such as master 
plans. In particular, the study argues how private interests of real estate 
developers were championed by politicians (in return for campaign funds) at the 
expense of sound town planning. 
 
Politics comes with the exercise of power. Here, power is deﬁned as ‘a general 
matrix of force relations at a given time, in a given society’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1983: 186), where ‘certain actions structure the ﬁeld of other possible actions’ 
(Foucault, 1983: 222). In this regard, the practice and profession of planning 
navigates through power differences. In relation to power and planners, Forester 
(1989) argues that understanding of power relations by planners helps the 
planner's decision making. As such, often institutional actors who wield more 
power tend to dictate planning processes to citizens, based on among others, how 
and when resources are allocated to planning programmes at grassroots level. 
 
In other sub-Saharan African cities such as Maputo, it has been argued that 
planning by the state has limited practical impact with non-state actors playing a 
vital role in shaping urban development (Anderson, Jenkins, & Nielsen, 2015). 
Other political actors such as coalitions of the urban poor, community based 
organisations and civil society organisations have profound impact on how 
planning shapes the form and structure of cities. Various actors in planning 
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processes means among other considerations that planners have to mediate 
contradictory interests. Moreover, in African cities, urban residents are building 
cities using a grassroots approach which is contrary to state-led top-down 
approach to planning (Jenkins, 2013). 
 
Flyvbjerg (1998: 322) argues that in mainstream planning approaches, issues 
shaping planning ‘are deﬁned more by stable power relations than by antagonistic 
confrontations’. However, in a context where politics and power are both 
inherently and deeply contested, the  conduct  of  planning  becomes  tenuous  
and  problematic.  In Zimbabwe, tension between central and local governments 
has revolved around politics associated with land for urban planning and 
housing development (Muchadenyika, 2015a). In this instance, central 
government has seemingly usurped the powers of local authorities in determining 
planning processes and outcomes. On the other hand, local authorities have 
accused central government of running a parallel urban planning system. 
 
The preceding discussion implies that planning is inherently a political process. 
Accordingly, it becomes necessary to understand how planners conduct planning 
in  the face of contested politics. Before proceeding to such analysis, the paper 
provides the context of politics and planning in Zimbabwe and the research 
methodology used to empirically ground this article. 
 
3. Politics and planning in Zimbabwe: the context 
In colonial Zimbabwe, planning has been used as an instrument of white settler 
control and restriction (Potts, 2011). In the post-independence era, planning has 
mainly been used as an instrument to re-organise the society and economy as well 
as advancing political interests and objectives of the ruling regime. In essence, 
planning was and is used as a tool to achieve national development goals as well 
as political objectives of the ruling elite. However, where planning militates 
against the interests and objectives of the ruling elite, it is either ignored or 
rendered useless (Muchadenyika, 2015a). 
 
This section highlights four main issues or programmes which had profound 
inﬂuence on planning in Zimbabwe. First, in the 1990s, the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) resulted in the formal adoption by the government 
of non-residential activities in residential zones. This is despite that these 
informal activities existed way before the 1990s. Such non-residential activities 
(such as medical resource institutions and centres; shops and ofﬁces; service 
industry; warehousing and general maintenance; storage and special industrial 
use) were permitted through Statutory Instrument 216 of 1994 in residential areas 
(GoZ, 1994). Urban economies in sub-Saharan Africa were profoundly altered by 
structural adjustment programmes (Potts, 2006a). In Zimbabwe, structural 
adjustment programmes also precipitated the sudden rise in informal business, 
popularly referred to as home industries. In the Zimbabwean context, a home 
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industry is ‘a site legally zoned for small scale urban informal economic activities’ 
(Kamete, 2004: 120). Home industries were initiated in the 1990s as part of the 
government's indigenisation and economic empowerment drive (Jones, 2010). 
The permission of industrial activities within residential zones meant that 
planning was supposed to deal with inherent issues emanating from mixed-
zoning. In brief, structural adjustment programmes challenged and changed the 
conventional approach to planning. 
 
Second, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which started in 2000 
has extreme and far reaching implications to coherent urban planning and 
development in cities (Muchadenyika, 2015a). In fact, the programme reversed 
planning procedures of layout planning, surveying, servicing and occupation. In 
other words, the land reform programme transgressed the bureaucratised and 
technocratic planning system in Zimbabwe. Due to the chaotic manner in which the 
FTLRP was executed and the politics associated with it, returning to the use of 
rational planning frameworks faces enormous opposition (Marongwe, 2011). 
Planners became enmeshed between adhering to planning principles and 
government's radical objective of land redistribution. In a way, town planning was 
set aside, as it became difﬁcult to stand in the way of the FTLRP with logical 
arguments without being a victim of harassment both professionally and physically. 
The wilful disregard of planning is evidenced by the lack of planning, infrastructure 
and basic services in most rural and urban settlements which developed during and 
after the land reform programme (see Matondi, 2012). 
 
Post-2000, the political construction of central government and urban local 
authorities consists respectively of the ruling party, ZANU-PF and the opposition 
MDC. Thus, the rivalry between two aforesaid major political parties affected the 
practice of planning. Planning is a function of governance. However, political 
contestation turned the planning and governance of urban areas into a political 
battleﬁeld, characterised by the centralisation of power and ZANU-PF party 
structures usurping the powers of local authorities (McGregor, 2013). Such a 
political rivalry meant that parties contested planning processes and outcomes, 
with the planner caught in the middle. Planners working for local authorities 
would be accused for advancing or blocking the interests of the opposition party. At 
the same time, planners working for the government would be seen as 
‘gatekeepers’ for the ruling party. 
 
The institutional arrangement of local government includes the national 
government (in particular the local government ministry), provincial and local 
governments (urban and rural local authorities). This is in line with the new 
Constitution adopted in 2013. Before the 2013 constitution, local government was 
not constitutionalised and hence the national government intervened and interfered 
in local authority affairs at will. However, the new dispensation with three tiers of 
government is still to be implemented as the ruling party, ZANU-PF sees 
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devolution as ‘a threat to its hold on power’ and has ‘a strong belief in centralization’ 
(Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016: 269). As such, despite local authorities being 
granted the right to run their own affairs in the Constitution, in practice, though, 
local authorities lack autonomy and real power to plan and govern cities. In fact, 
the national government manipulates local governments to advance its interests, in 
particular, those of ZANU-PF (Ibid). 
 
In 2005, the government began a programme called OM/RO mainly ‘to deal with 
crime, squalor and lawlessness, and rebuild and organise urban settlements and 
small and medium enterprises in a way that would bring dignity, order and 
prosperity to the stakeholders and the nation at large’ (GoZ, 2005: 2). The 
Operation targeted informalised urban employment and ‘illegal’ low-income 
housing solutions in urban areas (Potts, 2006b). The programme also targeted 
informal business enterprises in cities and towns. Prior, during and after the 
Operation, there, however, appears to be a total disregard of urban planning 
principles by both the government and citizenry. Estimates indicate that more 
than 700,000 people were left homeless by the Operation (UN, 2005). It should 
also be emphasised that, during the Operation, planning was used to settle 
political differences (Bracking, 2005). In this case, it seems to be 
incontrovertible that planning functions as means to silence and crush any 
potential threat to the ruling elites. 
 
Zimbabwe's urban planning has been described as ‘the most established, also 
the most conservative and least compromising in sub-Saharan Africa’ (Kamete, 
2007: 154). Thus, it is widely acknowledged that Zimbabwe's planning system is 
highly technocratic, bureaucratised and out of sync with prevailing socio-economic 
realities (Potts, 2006b; GoZ, 2009; Kamete, 2006, 2007). Yet, that would signiﬁcantly 
change with the politics of urban control. To explain such change, we explore the 
effects of centre-local relations on planners, how planners executed their duties in 
a turbulent political environment, and OM/RO and the public image of the 
planning profession. 
 
4. Research methodology 
The aim of the paper is to explore how politics affects the practice and profession 
of planning. This paper is based on 20 interviews conducted with practising 
planners (in government, local authorities and non-governmental organisations 
[NGOs]), councillors and mayors, and other politicians. These respondents were 
primarily drawn from ﬁve cities namely Bulawayo, Gweru, Harare, Mutare and 
Masvingo. Table 1 shows the list of people interviewed. Respondents were 
purposively selected using criteria such as afﬁliation, role in planning, role in 
politics, and understanding of the subject matter. The interviews were primarily 
premised on understanding how politics has affected the profession and practice of 
planning. In particular, the interviews mainly centred on the effects of contentious 
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centre-local relations on planners, executing planning duties in a turbulent political 
environment and the impacts of OM/ RO on the planning profession. 
 
The paper mainly focuses on OM/RO, politics of urban control and the FTLRP, 
largely because, these three constitute the main political issues that comprehensively 
altered the planning of Zimbabwean cities. These three also led to the problem of 
the informalisation of planning which changed the form and structure of cities. 
Whilst the OM/RO was a once-off event, the FTRLP is still ongoing particularly in 
peri-urban areas. In order to gather data from practical experiences, the authors 
make sure that most of the respondents were actively involved in planning during 
and after OM/RO and FTLRP. The key research questions which guided the research 
were as follows: 
 
a. How does politics affect the practice and profession of planning? 
b. What are the political events or programmes which have had an impact on 
planning? 
c. How do planners execute duties in a highly contested political environment? 
 
5. Findings and discussion 
5.1. Centre-local relations and planners 
By centre-local relations, we refer to the relationship between the national 
government and urban local authorities. Such relations are deﬁned in law and 
affected by the prevailing political environment. The Regional Town and Country 
Planning Act (RTCPA) gives the national government authority to monitor 
planning standards, the built environment and the overall urban development 
process (GoZ, 1996). At the same time, local authorities as local planning 
authorities are mandated with carrying out planning functions in their areas of 
jurisdiction. In principle, such a relationship bolsters checks and balances in the 
planning system. 
 
However, post-2000, the rise of the MDC in governing urban areas strained 
relations between the national government and urban local authorities. Tensions 
between central and local governments affected the conduct of planning 
(Muchadenyika, 2015a). For example, the ‘FTLRP encroached into peri-urban areas 
and it became very difﬁcult to implement and monitor town planning as the planning 
profession was viliﬁed by  politicians’ (A12).  In peri-urban  areas, the  FTLRP  
disregarded planning procedures of urban local authorities (see Matondi, 2012). 
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Town planning principles and foundations were in place but were defeated by 
politics. In fact, ‘ZANU-PF defeated town planning’ (A1). The FTLRP brought tension 
in peri-urban areas affecting land and delivery of planning services. MDC-run urban 
local authorities saw the programme as a ‘strategic attempt to destabilise planning 
and governance in cities’ (A10). Cities were overtaken by a particular form of urban 
development driven by formal and informal party structures affecting how planning 
is conducted. In this instance, ‘planners had no role to play; they were the bonds 
[as in a chess game], the people sacriﬁced’ (A2). In urban and peri-urban areas, the 
use of informal institutions and the manner in which the FTLRP took root limited 
the role of planners to effectively plan cities. Informal institutions performed 
functions of local authorities, informalised planning and governance and worked 
against MDC-run local authorities (Kriger, 2012; McGregor, 2013). 
 
The national government has the mandate to deliver some services and plan in 
cities without the involvement of the local authorities. This is shown in peri-
urban settlements planned and developed by the local government ministry. A 
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government planning ofﬁcer presents planning challenges arising from such an 
arrangement as: 
 
After 2000, we have seen the government, in particular, the local government 
ministry increasingly running parallel structures in cities. The ministry has a ﬁrm 
control on the allocation of state land to beneﬁciaries aligned to the ruling party. 
This arrangement means that subsequent planning processes are led by the 
national government though in areas under the jurisdiction of local authorities. It 
became  problematic  as  urban  local  authorities  challenged  the recognition of 
settlements planned outside their structures (A20). 
 
The change of use provision (Section 351) in the RTCPA led to most open 
(recreational) spaces being converted to private and commercial use. However, 
such change of use in urban areas ‘distorted the zoning system’ (A3). A city planner 
in a rather blunt terms argued that ‘political players and their cronies exerted 
pressure for change of use on planners’ (A18). Ultimately, most open and often 
recreational spaces in Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Masvingo were converted 
into private built up spaces. In most instances, change of use beneﬁtted politicians, 
business moguls and foreign business enterprises. Partly, such changes led to ‘the 
unpopularity of planning and its association with the wealthy and powerful’ 
(Kamete, 2011: 83). 
 
Housing co-operatives formed at the behest of political parties bypassed normal 
urban planning procedures (Muchadenyika, 2015a). Such co-operatives have also 
been performing planning functions such as land allocation, layout planning, and 
approving house construction strategies. In this regard, most settlements are 
without infrastructure services. Reasons for this structural neglect of planning 
are twofold: ‘one is ﬁnancial constraints and the second is politicians allowing 
people to by-pass planning procedures thereby implying development precede 
infrastructure leading to disorganised urban planning’ (A3). Politics associated 
with land for housing distorts coordinated development planning in cities, for 
several reasons. First, ‘this manifests in numerous unplanned settlements with 
politicians seemingly having more power than local planning authorities in such 
areas’ (A8). Second, unplanned settlements apparently ensure the longevity of 
politicians in power and are a guarantor of largesse during the protracted period of 
ﬁnancial challenges. 
 
In Senegal, Uganda and South Africa, research indicates that in opposition 
controlled cities, politics ‘become problematic for the delivery of urban services’ 
(Resnick, 2014: s3). In Zimbabwe, the polarisation and contestation between the 
MDC and ZANU-PF posed severe problems to urban planning. A senior Harare 
city planner argued that ‘contradictions in policy framework between central and 
local governments made planning extremely difﬁcult’ (A4). This is evidenced by 
the recruitment moratorium placed by the local government ministry on all major 
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cities. Under the recruitment moratorium, ‘development control and development 
planning functions were negatively affected’ (A4). By December 2011, the City of 
Harare's Department of Urban Planning Services had 168 vacancies, a condition 
that weakened the delivery of planning services (CoH DUPS, 2012). The 
moratorium was aimed at ‘preventing the MDC councillors from employing loyal 
party supporters’ (A10). City planning departments have been constrained by 
human resources shortages to carry out development control functions. 
Subsequently, informal developments sprouted in most urban centres as 
residents erected structures without plan approval. 
 
When the MDC controlled urban local authorities, ZANU-PF did not accept the 
reality arguing that it was a regime change strategy. Within three months of MDC 
mayorship in Harare, most roads had been repaired ‘which showed a real grasp 
of urban issues’ (A5). However, in justifying the dismissal of the MDC mayor, the 
local government minister cited poor service delivery performance. Conversely, 
Machingauta (2010: 146) argues that ‘the impression created by the suspension 
and subsequent dismissal was that the suspension and subsequent dismissal had 
nothing to do with service delivery but was meant to frustrate local councils 
controlled by the opposition political party’. It would seem that, ZANU-PF could 
not allow progress in an MDC-run council as the success of MDC would deter 
ZANU-PF's political fortunes. In this instance, the national government had no 
motivation to improve performance and service delivery by local authorities 
(Resnick, 2014). After dismissing MDC mayors, central government appointed 
Commissions to run cities. 
 
During the leadership of appointed Commissions, planners interviewed argued 
that they could not execute their professional duties according to the standards 
of town planning practice (A4, A1, A15, A18). In this regard, appointed 
commissions made planners appendages of political party interests. This is 
revealed by corrupt procedures during land alienation processes; with ZANU-PF 
ofﬁcials as major beneﬁciaries (City of Harare, 2010). 
 
In view of the corruption, planners were being forced to compromise planning 
principles in order to meet the requirements of either councillors or the local 
government minister (City of Harare, 2010). Approval of plans was inﬂuenced by 
politics as ‘planners were forced to approve plans quickly, compromising normal 
planning procedures’ (A6). This is evidenced by the widespread mushrooming of 
residential areas without proper urban planning services. These areas include but 
are not limited to areas such as Saturday Retreat, Whitecliff, Hopley, Hatcliffe 
extension among others in Harare and Cowdray Park in Bulawayo. In the 
aforementioned areas, while layout planning was carried out, people settled 
without water and sanitation facilities and roads. Thus, people rely on wells, 
septic tanks and road openings. In addition, the majority of housing structures 
in those areas are unplanned. Apart from the planned areas, there is an increase 
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of unplanned settlements in adjacent areas with land allocated through political 
structures. Planners might not have wanted the haphazard urban development 
that took effect but ‘political pressure led to the compromise of planning regulations 
and standards’ (A13). 
 
It can be argued that due to mostly political interference; rational, rigorous 
planning procedures were suspended and ‘in the process weakening the 
planning profession’ (A18). Nevertheless, ‘problems encountered in cities were far 
beyond planners as there was disorder in cities’ (A7). The informal urban 
economy has surpassed the formal requirements of planning laws and regulations. 
In particular, urban poverty in Zimbabwe manifests in ubiquitous informal 
economic activities and housing (Potts, 2006b; Musoni, 2010). In such a context, 
the planner was caught in-between vested interests: ‘dealing with political vultures 
and trying to be impartial breeding a crippled planner’ (A4). However,  the  
presence  of  planners  in  both  central  government (Department of Physical 
Planning) and urban local authorities somehow limited the negative impacts of 
the competing centre-local relations to planners. This is, however, not to deny 
that there is tension between planners in central government and those in urban 
local authorities. We argue that such tensions seem to emanate from different 
loyalties and allegiances—a veritable battleground during ﬁscal constraints, social 
discontent, and turbulent politics. 
 
5.2 Planners and turbulent politics 
As indicated at the outset of this paper, planning is in politics, cannot escape politics 
and the role of planners is, indeed, highly political (Albrechts, 2003). It is, 
therefore, important, to understand, contextually, how political tensions affect 
planners. The political environment in which the planner operated was contested 
and confusing (A1). The consolidated voice of professionals at higher levels became 
critical. In this context, the image and integrity of planning needed strong defence 
from a vibrant professional association. However, the Zimbabwe Institute of 
Regional and Urban Planners (ZIRUP) ‘failed to bring to the attention of the local 
government ministry issues affecting the planner’ (A8). The collective voice of 
planners in a more systematic way was weak complicating the planners'  work. It 
should however be noted that ZIRUP is a voluntary association not backed by any 
law. Partly, this explains the weakness of ZIRUP as a professional association. 
 
Watson (2014: 118) argues that planners should uphold professional ethics that is 
‘professional conduct’ and ‘the nature of the planning process and its outcomes’. 
The representation of a consolidated voice of planners is vital in defending 
professionals and the integrity of the profession. However, since its formation in 
the early 1980s, ‘ZIRUP has struggled to become a respectable professional body 
even amongst planners themselves’ (A12). Planning as a practice has also 
changed, with planners working in civil society and non-governmental 
organisations, international development agencies, local authorities and 
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government. However, the ﬂagship ZIRUP annual school has not transformed 
itself to depict the changing reality in which the majority of planners are working 
in. Further, ‘the body has not stood ﬁrm in defending attacks on the profession 
and planners’ (A14). Rather, leaders of ZIRUP have largely succumbed to politics; 
a development which irks ordinary people. This has, however, dented the image 
and credibility of the profession in the eyes of the general public. 
 
Urban planning has two sides; forward planning and development control. 
Forward planning, that is, master and local planning suffered due to insufﬁcient 
resources and political turbulence as ‘all statutory plans in use in Zimbabwe are 
out of time’ (A9). Development control activities such as enforcing regulations, 
approval of plans, transport and vender management suffered as the economy 
turned informal. It was ‘therefore not possible to enforce using planning 
regulations prepared in a normal economy’ (A1). In such an environment, 
planning became nearly impossible emphasising ad hoc issues, and reactive as 
opposed to futuristic forward planning. In most cities, ‘transport management 
became a de facto responsibility of ZANU-PF youth who went as far as collecting 
fees from commuter operators’ (A18). It is widely believed that such forms of 
extortion were organised and worked under the direction of senior politicians. 
 
The calibre of mayors is a critical element determining how planners execute their 
duties in a turbulent political environment. For the City of Harare, city planners 
interviewed applauded Mayor Masunda (2008–13) for being dynamic, 
apolitical, and his tremendous role in assisting the work of planners (A4). For 
instance, the Mayor played an instrumental role in the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation project which strengthened and capacitated the City of Harare's urban 
planning department with information communication technologies and 
geographic information systems (GIS) (Muchadenyika, 2015b). The department 
had been struggling to acquire GIS equipment and the city was having difﬁculties 
in funding the initial capital (A2). Due to the Gates Foundation project, the urban 
planning department is in a position ‘to produce accurate and up-to-date urban 
planning maps and data which inform decision making consequently helping in 
service delivery’ (A4). Further, the City's survey department is now able to contract 
out, ‘due to capitalisation from the Gates Foundation project, whose compliments 
can be attributed to the City mayor’ (A4). 
 
The division of labour between politicians and planners was blurred. There exist 
duplication of roles and responsibilities between planners and politicians. For 
instance, a city planner highlighted that: 
 
Planning is the responsibility of planners. However, we are having situations 
where politicians are coming to us sometimes with already prepared layout plans. 
They are dictating to us to put land uses where they want without any planning 
rationality. Are we still planners then? Are politicians now the new planners? 
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Politicians must handle political and governance issues while we handle technical 
aspects such as planning (A18). 
 
In addition, there were struggles between planners and young people in cities 
(A4). Young people with ‘protection from political parties invaded most urban 
spaces’ (A17). Political party youth wings occupied and used open places illegally. In 
such situations, planners could not act as professional interlocutors as young 
people were a mere front of politicians and in many instances, with the state 
backing. 
 
Allegiance and patronage affected the recruitment of chief city planners as 
illustrated by the following example. The Chief City planners were ‘purely political 
posts, thus, candidates were vetted over political afﬁliation’ (A4). In this regard, 
planners had to ensure a balance between appeasing the appointing authority and 
planning rationality. Indeed, it would seem that the obvious looser became the 
latter. What this example illustrates is that planning is an intricate process, 
profoundly inﬂuenced, if not shaped by adversarial political processes. Invariably, 
planning has not been devoid of political interference and meddling, as the 
discussion on OM/RO here below indicates. 
 
5.3 Operation Murambatsvina and the planning profession 
Whilst the Government of Zimbabwe has tried to portray the objectives of OM/RO 
as purely planning based (GoZ, 2005), evidence suggests to both political and 
planning motivations (Bratton & Masunungure, 2006; Bracking, 2005). 
Disorganised urban planning resulted in the infamous OM/RO of 2005. 
However, it should be noted that ‘such disorganisation was a creation of 
collusion between politicians and planners to achieve goals of the former’ (A1). 
This view is corroborated by Chipungu and Adebayo (2012) who points to the 
undue party political inﬂuence on the process of planning. For instance, the role of 
politics during the Operation is demonstrated in the case of the local government 
minister who ofﬁciated at Joshua Nkomo housing co-operative which was later 
destroyed during the Operation. Upon the destruction of co-operative houses, the 
minister argued ‘if you invite me to your wedding I will come but I cannot know 
that you are wedding someone's wife!’ (A11). Politically aligned co-operatives are at 
the centre of pursuing a parallel planning system in cities. Such co-operatives 
provide a platform for political organisation within the urban environs with 
access to land traded for political participation and allegiance. 
 
Party politics resulted in the problem of overcrowding and informal settlements in 
cities; with party structures performing de facto urban planning functions. In 
such a context, planners and other urban development professionals were 
constrained (A15). Prior to the Operation, the form and structure of cities had 
signiﬁcantly changed as if ‘there was no planning at all’ (A14). The preamble of the 
Regional Town and Country Planning Act states the objectives of town planning. 
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Among them is protecting the physical environment, which was a key deliverable 
for Operation Murambatsvina, one can argue. Prior to the Operation, there was 
wanton destruction of the physical environment exposing communities to 
health and natural hazards (A16). A senior Harare city planner argued that ‘the 
United Nations Special Envoy was a ‘traitor’ as she appeased her paymasters 
instead of the welfare of the people—a challenge that planners face’ (A4). 
 
The impact of OM/RO exposed planning as a profession in contestation. OM/RO 
resembles the failure of planning, one can argue. Planning had ‘failed to respond to 
challenges it was supposed to address’ (A7). If planning served its purpose, it would 
have planned and handled OM/RO in a professional manner and there would be no 
need for another Operation. In reality, planning principles to address informality 
were superseded by politics. On the other hand, ‘the government's housing 
destruction during OM/RO emphasised the essence of planning, which can be 
understood as the supremacy of planning’ (A18). Consequently a senior planner 
argued that ‘OM/RO was the best thing that happened to planners as all of a 
sudden planning was elevated though planners did not capitalise on the 
programme’ (A8). However, gradually, things reverted to pre-OM/RO with 
planning and planners becoming somewhat ‘irrelevant’. 
 
On the other hand, planning did not enforce OM/RO as a policy, though planning 
laws and regulations were used. Planning was very insensitive and unreasonable to 
the public eye ‘though Zimbabweans remember OM/RO not much about planners, 
but the brutality of Robert Mugabe and his regime’ (A12). During OM/RO the 
violence was systematic and targeted at areas where the opposition MDC garnered 
majority votes (Bracking, 2005). In this instance, ZANU-PF thought that the ‘people 
who voted for MDC were mainly residing in unplanned settlements’ (A6). The plan 
was to send MDC supporters to rural areas under the control of traditional chiefs 
who are often loyal to ZANU-PF (A17). However, ‘with time, it emerged that OM/RO 
political motivations were bigger than planning motivations’ (Muchadenyika, 
2015b: 3). It is in such political struggles in which the planning profession is often 
entangled, frequently undermining the credibility of the profession. 
 
During OM/RO, expensive housing structures were destroyed in the name of 
planning. The Operation also destroyed many home industries which were a 
livelihood source for the majority of urban residents (Jones, 2010). This made 
planning to people not a humane, sensitive profession to assist them but a 
‘dictatorial, and demagogue profession to make people's lives difﬁcult’ (A6). Yet, 
that is not the intention of planning. As such, planning is viewed with scepticism 
as a profession out to ﬁnd and punish culprits (A17). Even the United Nations 
Special Envoy Report did not exonerate planners; rather, it attacked planning law 
and regulations. Kamete (2009) argues that planning deserves blame during the 
Operation. This is mainly because, illegal settlements sprouted in the presence of 
planners and ‘only to turn against these settlements when ZANU-PF lost support in 
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cities’ (A12). In this case, planning became a useful tool to achieve political 
objectives of the ruling regime. 
 
Judging from OM/RO and the aftermath, planners are ‘not considered important 
by both the public and government’ (A2). As such, the profession of planning has 
little merit in Zimbabwe. This is exacerbated by the absence of a vibrant 
professional planning association (A14). It can, however, be argued that the 
future of planning in the country rests on the country shifting from predatory to 
inclusive politics. The process of ‘plan preparation, application for planning 
permit and approval has institutionalised corruption’ (A13). Such rent seeking 
behaviour in the profession damaged the image of the profession. Corruption is 
exacerbated by the fact that the profession is unregulated and hence, there are no 
penalties for professional misconduct. It can be argued that the planning system 
has remained intact, though corruption has deeply inﬁltrated it. 
 
Planning, as a profession, is not regulated in Zimbabwe. As such, anyone can 
practice planning—a situation which makes it difﬁcult to regulate planning 
practice. Such ‘non-regulation signiﬁcantly accounts why we ended up having 
Operation Murambatsvina’ (A13). Government, however, regulates other 
professions in the built environment such as engineering, surveying and 
architecture. The non-regulation of planning as a profession can be interpreted 
as government placing little value and respect on planning. The apparent lack of 
order that obtains in Zimbabwe's urban areas which has transgressed planning 
principles, can in part, be attributed to an unregulated profession. An unregulated 
profession ‘seems to become instrumental in political manipulation and 
advancing political interests’ (A10). 
 
Indeed, during OM/RO, planners and the professional body failed to bring to light 
the government excesses in using and abusing planning laws and regulations to 
crush what people had built for years. Regrettably, there is evidence to suggest 
that some of the houses demolished were formally planned, and approved or 
regularised (Nhekairo, 2012). It is such cases to which planners should have 
drawn attention and defended. In other words, ‘planners failed to identify 
themselves with their work’ (A15). A senior planner asked: ‘how do people view the 
profession of planning in cases where formally planned and approved houses 
were demolished? I think one is quick to associate planning with confusion and 
lack of integrity and ethics’ (A13). 
 
The impacts of OM/RO notwithstanding, it can be argued that the planning 
profession had long lost credibility during the ESAP period (1990–95). During 
this period, planning was criticised by groups like the ‘Afﬁrmative Action Group, 
Indigenous Groups, and the National Economic Planning Commission making 
spatial planning a nuisance’ (A12). Indigenisation and afﬁrmative action had a 
tendency to ﬂout urban planning laws as city leaders colluded with business 
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interests (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012). It can be argued that the cumulative impact of 
OM/RO, indigenisation, land reform and afﬁrmative action, four structural 
interventions resulted in politics overriding planning and the indirect acceptance of 
informal planning systems. 
 
OM/RO had substantial repercussions on planning as a profession. The 
reputation of planning as a profession was severely compromised during and after 
Operation Murambatsvina (Kamete, 2007). This is exacerbated by the country's 
failure to embark on reform of planning systems. Moreover, the United Nations 
Special Envoy Report described the Regional Town and Country Planning Act as 
‘outdated’ and in need of immediate revision. Three years after OM/RO, the 
government-led second National Housing Convention castigated town planning 
standards as ‘very high, very elaborate, rigid […] and not responsive to the needs 
and requirements of the end users’ (GoZ, 2009: ix). However, such observation is 
yet to translate into the actual revision of planning laws and standards. 
 
Using three settlements in Harare affected by OM/RO, we argue that many 
demolished areas were reinvaded and that the Operation led to new informal 
settlements. For example, in Dzivarasekwa Extension, informal settlers reinvaded 
the area without planning and infrastructure services. However, the Harare Slum 
Upgrading Programme (2010–15) provided planning and infrastructure services 
and secure tenure to 480 households on the reinvaded settlement (see 
Muchadenyika, 2015b). In Saturday Retreat, government demolished the 
settlement during OM/RO. However, despite producing a layout plan and surveying 
of stands, a signiﬁcant portion of the area has been settled informally. Informal 
settlers evicted from different parts of Harare in 2005 settled informally in 
Caledonia. The settlement grew organically, though without planning and 
infrastructure services. In fact, only phases 1–3 (6960 residential stands) had an 
approved layout plan while phases 4–20 (15,450 stands) has no approved plan 
(MLGPWNH, 2015). Caledonia is home to about 115,000 people making it perhaps 
the largest informal settlement within City of Harare boundaries. However, in 2015, 
government through the Urban Development Corporation began a process of 
regularising the settlement. The regularisation approved layout plans for phases 
4–20 and ‘regularised 27,000 houses with about 90% of the structures being 
completed houses’ (A20). The regularisation process was government-directed 
and bypassed the City of Harare though it is the local planning authority. This 
shows ‘the tensions associated with planning in which the national government 
usurps local authority functions in a bid to meet political objectives of the ruling 
party’ (A19). Caledonia is an important constituency for ZANU-PF in Harare. 
 
Based on the above, OM/RO did not resolve the challenge of informal settlements. 
Rather, it shifted the geography of such settlements with government failing to 
provide services in both formal and informal settlements. A study by the City of 
Harare proﬁled and enumerated 62 slums within Harare in 2014 (City of Harare, 
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Dialogue on Shelter and Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation, 2014). It can 
therefore be argued that government did not ‘restore order’ in peri-urban areas. 
Rather, a new wave of militant illegality emerged in urban areas largely driven by 
politics. The aftermath of OM/RO had ‘a huge strain on planning as militant 
movements reversed the procurement process of formal housing’ (A15). Post-
2000, the image of the planning profession suffered signiﬁcantly during the era 
of impunity which spilled into urban planning. The informal structure of cities 
stands as an empirical record of such forms of disorganised planning. In its bid to 
reclaim the urban constituency; ZANU-PF ‘forced councillors and councils to turn a 
blind eye into disorganised urban planning’ (A10). Unplanned and informal 
settlements sprouted. Such partisan political elements affected town planning, 
with planners becoming, seemingly largely powerless. Thus, the efﬁcacy of 
planning as a profession was and is still being questioned. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The evidence of political interference marshalled in this paper, also suggests that 
the profession of planning, in the midst of political contestation, has severely 
undermined planning and its contribution towards organised cities. Planners 
succumbed to politics of patronage at the expense of urban residents and town 
planning principles. Simply put, the ZANU-PF government defeated the intentions 
of town planning as planning laws and regulations only applied where the party had 
no interests. Partly, the failure of planning manifested in the infamous Operation 
Murambatsvina, which displaced millions of people. The national government 
used and abused town planning laws and regulations to back a hasty and insincere 
Operation Restore Order. In a way, the Operation exposed planning with the 
efﬁcacy of the profession questioned. Planners interviewed indicated that the 
profession of planning is weak, under siege from politicians and confused. 
 
Perhaps, the central argument of the paper is that planning is distorted by 
contested politics. In such instances, developing sustainable cities becomes a 
deferred reality. As such, the integrity of the profession and practice of planning is 
fundamental in attaining SDG 11. In that vein, the role of planners and planning 
should be mainstreamed in the development agenda through sustained, 
grassroots-driven contestation and engagement with local authorities. 
 
Managing the process of urbanisation requires a strong and vibrant planning 
profession to handle overarching issues and inherent conﬂicts. Since widespread 
disorder seems to prevail in the Zimbabwean built environment, we recommend 
that the planning profession be regulated and provide the minimum ethical 
standards for the development of cities. In this regard, the planning professional 
body ZIRUP should be legally recognised and mandated with functions such as 
registration, monitoring and evaluation of professional planners. 
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